Last class thrilled me. Almost forgot.
As we move into discussing Kierkegaard’s modes of existence, I think it’s important to return to the epistemic necessity that all models are wrong, but some are useful. That is: no finite, limited categorization or means of understanding the universe (as all human endeavors necessarily are) can successfully integrate the nigh-infinite amount of information necessary to describe the universe with perfect accuracy. Human ignorance is infinite. We can learn more (provisionally, contingently), but cannot know all.
As we move into discussing Kierkegaard’s modes of existence, I think it’s important to return to the epistemic necessity that all models are wrong, but some are useful. That is: no finite, limited categorization or means of understanding the universe (as all human endeavors necessarily are) can successfully integrate the nigh-infinite amount of information necessary to describe the universe with perfect accuracy. Human ignorance is infinite. We can learn more (provisionally, contingently), but cannot know all.
I’d like to
unpack a few Kierkegaard statements that I find central to the entire
argument. “Truth is,” he says, “. . . is
the daring venture of choosing the objective uncertainty with the passion of
the infinite” (Solomon, 21). What,
precisely, does this mean? We’ve
discussed objective uncertainty a fair bit, but haven’t bothered to really
define it. What does it mean? It means what I outlined in my first paragraph: that human knowledge is, inevitably,
contingent, provisional, and dubitable; that repeated interrogation of a claim
and its constituent claims must lead, eventually, to presuppositions
unjustifiable by reasoned appeal to nature; that, in short, everything is
uncertain. Furthermore, reason and the
interrogation of the natural world provide no prescription; reason provides
many claims about what is, but none
about what should be. Prescription, that is, the should, must be introduced, arbitrarily,
without “reasonable” justification.
Thus, reason can (contingently, provisionally) shed light on what is, and what options in life are
available to us, and what might result from those options; but it fundamentally
cannot tell us what we should
do. So then, how do we know what to do?
Well, we don’t. We don’t know what to do. We can’t point at some ironclad line of logic
beginning from demonstrable descriptive appeals to natural law and say, “This
proves that x or y course of action is inherently right.” No, we choose
what to do, and in that choice is Kierkegaard’s truth. Choice is faith; if not in God, then in one’s
own senses, in the idea that one is not living in a pointless hallucination,
that the sun will continue to come up tomorrow (though it cannot be logically
demonstrated), and that it makes sense to do anything at all in a world that
has no logically demonstrable meaning. “If
I can grasp God objectively, I do not,” says Kierkegaard, and moreover, he
cannot, need not, “have faith.” God is
unknowable. The world is
unknowable. Faith is continuing to
engage, with God, with reality, with one’s next-door neighbor, in light and in
spite of indefatigable uncertainty. Truth is deciding to take one of the myriad,
objectively valueless paths in life, in making meaning of the meaningless. And, as I’ve said before, I think that’s a
thing of beauty.
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